Abstract. Dierent security policy models have been developed and published in the past. Proven security policy models, if correctly implemented, guarantee the protection of data objects from unauthorized access or usage or prevent an illegal information ow. To verify that a security policy model has been correctly implemented, it is important to dene and execute an exhaustive list of test cases, which verify that the formal security policy neither has been over-constrained nor underconstrained. In this paper we present a method for dening an exhaustive list of test cases, based on formally described equivalence classes that are derived from the formal security policy description.
Introduction
Dierent security policy models have been developed and published in the past.
In 1989 Brewer and Nash presented their Chinese Wall Security Policy model that is based on conict of interest classes [2] . Other security policy models are a formalization of a military security model like the one from Bell and LaPadula [4] , they address the integrity of data objects in commercial transactions, as stated by Clark and Wilson [5] , control the information ow like the Limes Security Model from Hermann [6] or they are a model of access control like the access matrix dened by Lampson [1] . Each of these models denes the security requirements that have to be correctly implemented by a system for achieving a given security objective. If the security model has not been correctly implemented, the resulting system will be over-constrained or under-constrained.
After the correctness of the formal specication of the security model has been veried, the system implementation has to be validated against the security model. As discussed by Hu and Ahn in [7] a system is under-constrained if, based on the security model, undesired system states are granted and over-constrained if desired system states are denied, which probably causes availability problems.
Murnane and Reed argument in [8] testing software after it is completed remains an important aspect of software quality assurance despite the recent emphasis on the use of formal methods and`defect-free' software development processes.
Our approach, presented in this paper, is a method for dening an exhaustive list of test cases based on formally described equivalence classes that are derived from the formal security policy description. The paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces some background on security models and testing, in particular equivalence class testing and section 3 gives an overview of related work.
Our approach is presented in section 4. We start with a formal denition of equivalence classes. For explaining the application of our approch, we dene the equivalence classes of the Bell and LaPadula model. Section 5 outlines opportunities for future work and draws conclusions.
2 State of the Art
Security Models
A security model denes rules and demonstrates, that if security requirements are correctly and completely educed from the rules and these requirements are correctly and completely implemented by a system, the system achieves a given security objective. Dierent security policy models like the one from Bell and LaPadula, are a formalization of a military security model in [4] or they address the integrity of data objects in commercial transactions, as stated by Clark and Wilson [5] . Grimm dened in [9] that all security models contain ve elements of description:
1. the denition of a superior security objective (informal), 2. the specication of secure system states (formal), 3 . rules for allowed state transitions (formal), 4. a security theorem that proves that an allowed state transition will transfer a secure state always into a secure state (formal), 5. a trust model that describes requirements for the system implementation and for the application environment in order to enable secure system states to achieve the superior security objective (semi-formal or informal).
The Bell and LaPadula Model In 1973 the rst complete formal dened security model has been described by David Elliott Bell and Leonard J. LaPadula in [4] . Bell and LaPadula dene a partial ordered set of security levels. The security levels are assigned to subjects -the active entities -and to objectsthe passive and data containing entities -in the model. The security level of a subject is called clearance level and the security level of an object is called classication. The superior security objective of the model is the prevention of a vertical information ow from top to bottom according to the partially ordered clearance and classication levels. The model denes two properties.
The ss-property denes that in order for a subject to read an object's data, the subject's clearance level must dominate the object's classication. The *-property authorizes a subject, only if the objects classication is more recent than the most sensitive object that it is currently allowed to read. Additionally, Bell and LaPadula dene the usage of a Lampson-matrix. In preparation of later usage Table 1 
an arbitrary element of Z is written z; z t = z(t) is the t-th state in the state sequence z state sequences Table 1 : Elements of the Bell-LaPadula-Model [4] Additionally the following denitions of system states and state-transition relations are done in [4] :
indicating which subjects have access to which objects in the state v, M ∈ M, indicating the entries of the Lampson-matrix in the state v and f ∈ F , indicating the clearance level of all subjects, the classication level of all objects, and the needs-to-know associated with all subjects and objects in the state v. [4] Denition 1 (Access-Matrix-Function).
, if and only if (x t , y t , z t , z t−1 ) ∈ W for each t ∈ T where z 0 is a specied initial state usually of the form (∅, M, f ) where ∅ denotes
Testing
Testing a system is an important aspect of quality assurance. But it does not prove the absence of errors; it can only prove the presence of features. Testing can be divided into functional and non-functional testing. By performing functional tests it is veried whether a system fulls its functional requirements or not.
When non-functional testing aspects are tested, they may not be related to a specic functional requirement, such as performance testing. In the past dierent test techniques have been developed, which can be split into black box and white box techniques. Black box techniques are testing techniques, where the test cases are primarily derived from the system specications and without knowledge of the inspected system implementations. These kind of testing techniques are testing the systems input and output behavior. Dierent types of black box testing techniques are equivalence class testing, boundary testing or fuzz testing [10] . White box techniques are testing techniques, which use knowledge about the internal composition of a system for the test case denition. [8] Equivalence Class Testing The equivalence class testing technique implies, that the input domain of a system is partitioned into a nte number of sets, called equivalence classes, such that the systems behavior to a test of a representative value, called test case, of one equivalence class is equal to the systems behavior to a test of any other value of the same equivalence class. If one test case of an equivalence class detects an error, any other test case of the same equivalence class will be expected to detect the same error. If one test case of an equivalence class does not detect an error, it is expected that not any of the test case of the same equivalence class will detect an error. [11] 3 Related Work
In [12] Hu et al. propose an approach for conducting conformance checking of access control policies, specied in XACML and they also propose an implementation of conformance checking based on previous XACML policy verication and testing tools. The work is based on a fault model [13] , a structural coverage measurement tool for dening policy coverage metrics [15] and a test generator [14] , developed by two of the authors in their former work. In [16] De Angelis et al. discuss access policy testing as a vital function of the trust network, in which users and service providers interact. User-centric security management is enabled by using automated compliance testing using an audit bus, sharing audit trails and governance information, to monitor service state and provide users with privacy protection in networks of services and a conceptual framework supporting on-line testing of deployed systems. The authors explain that for each service under test the component continuously veries that it does not violate any of the declared access control policies running for a set of test cases.
Hu and Ahn developed in [7] a methodological attempt to verify formal specications of a role-based access control model and corresponding policies. They also derived test cases from formal specications and validate conformance to the system design and implementation using those test cases. In [17] Denition 2 (equivalence class). Let a ∈ A and b ∈ P(S × O). The equivalence class of (a, b) is the set ec ab ⊆ A × P(S × O) with the property:
. . , ec n } be the set of all equivalence classes of a system.
In principal we distinguish between equivalence classes that satisfy the above dened security conditions and equivalence classes that violate these security conditions.
A proof concerning completeness is trivial and can easy be done by performing a logical AND-conjunction of the satisfying equivalence class, that has to be equal to the policy denition and a logical OR-conjunction of the violating equivalence classes, that has to be equal to the negation of the security policy denition.
In a rst preparative step the following security conditions SC are dened: The elements of an equivalence class containing Subject × Object tuples where the Subject is allowed to read access the Object, have to satisfy the f read security condition.
Denition 3 (security condition f read ).
(S, O) ∈ S × O satises the security condition relative f read , if
The elements of an equivalence class containing Subject × Object tuples where the Subject is allowed to write access the Object, have to satisfy the f write security condition.
Denition 4 (security condition f write ).
(S, O) ∈ S × O satises the security condition relative f write , if
The elements of an equivalence class containing Subject × Object tuples, where the Subject is allowed to read-write access the Object have to satisfy the f read−write security condition.
Denition 5 (security condition f read−write ).
(S, O) ∈ S × O satises the security condition relative f read−write , if
The elements of an equivalence class containing Subject × Object tuples, where the Subject is allowed to append access the Object have to satisfy the f append security condition.
Denition 6 (security condition f append ).
(S, O) ∈ S × O satises the security condition relative f append , if
The elements of an equivalence class containing Subject × Object tuples, where the Subject is allowed to execute the Object, have to satisfy the f execute security condition.
Denition 7 (security condition f execute ).
(S, O) ∈ S × O satises the security condition relative f execute , if
Equivalence classes denition
Based on the security conditions dened above, equivalence classes of the Bell and LaPadula model are dened now. As discussed above we distinguish between equivalence classes that satisfy the dened security conditions and equivalence classes that violate these security conditions.
Satisfying equivalence classes The test cases contained by the satisfying equivalence classes can be used to verify if the system is over-constrained.
Denition 8 (equivalence classes ec 1 , . . . , ec 5 ). 
Test cases denition
After the equivalence classes have been dened, a functional test can be performed. In the following section we dene a sample system. We start by dening the subjects, objects, classication, access attributes and Need-to-Knowcategories as well as the Lampson-matrix of the sample system.
Denition of the sample system Let S be the set of all subject in the sample system S = {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 , S 5 , S 6 , S 7 , S 8 },
Let O be the set of all objects in the sample system
Let C be a partial ordered set of classication C = {top secret, secret, classified, unclassified}, where top secret > secret > classified > unclassified.
Let A be the set of allowed access attributes in the sample system A = {read, write, read-write, execute, append}
Let K be the Need-to-Know-categories in the sample system In our paper we presented a method for dening an exhaustive list of test cases based on formally described equivalence classes that are derived from the formal security policy description. We distinguished between satisfying equivalence classes that are used to verify if the system is over-constrained and violating equivalence classes, showing if the system is under-constrained. Additionally we dened the equivalence classes for the Bell and LaPadula model and dened test cases, based on the Bell and LaPadula equivalence classes for a sample system.
Our current and further investigations will be in the eld of testing formally history based security models like the Limes Security model [6] and the Chinese Wall Security Policy model [2] .
